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THE CAROLENE PRODUCTS FOOTNOTE 
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Peter Linzer* 
We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amend-
ment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status 
of a poor relation .... 
Rehnquist, CJ., for the majority in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 
114 S. Ct. 2309, 2320 (1994) 
Footnote four to Carolene Products v. United Statesl is the 
most famous footnote in constitutional law.z Since its appear-
ance in Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's 1938 opinion for the 
Supreme Court, its meaning has been much debated. Early on, it 
was interpreted to mean that "personal" rights were to be pre-
ferred to economic rights,3 but in recent years, largely through 
• Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. A.B., Cornell, 1960; J.D., 
Columbia, 1963. I wish to thank Louis Lusky for his comments on this and an earlier 
draft, and Walter Gellhorn for being, as always, a good friend and a wonderful teacher. 
My colleague and friend David Dow encouraged me to write this article. I hope the 
reader concludes that David's advice was justified. 
1. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
2. Its only competitors seem to be footnote 11 to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U.S. 483,494 n.l1 (1954), (the infamous doll test footnote), and footnote 10 to Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966), (in which Justice Brennan put forth his 
"ratchet" theory that Congress could expand constitutional guaranties under the En-
abling Oauses of the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments, but could not contract them). 
3. In his recently published biography of Learned Hand, Professor Gerald Gunther 
describes Footnote Four as foreshadowing a battle in the early forties 
whether judicial restraint-broad deference to legislative resolutions of policy 
debates-should be the across-the-board position of the justices as to all types of 
laws, or whether there should be something of a double standard under which 
the justices would keep their hands off economic regulations and at the same 
time scrutinize more carefully those laws attacked as impinging on personal 
liberties. 
Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge 563 {Alfred A. Knopf, 1994). 
See also Herbert Wechsler, Stone and the Constitution, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 764, 795-800 
(1946). Shortly before Stone died, Edwin Borchard wrote, without direct reference to 
277 
278 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 12:277 
the efforts of Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely, it has been inter-
preted more narrowly, justifying judicial activism only when the 
majoritarian democracy does not work: Ely describes it as "rep-
resentation-reinforcement," a process-based notion that the 
courts should use judicial review aggressively only when the elec-
toral process has broken down or is tampered with or when liti-
gants are deemed not to have a fair chance to achieve change at 
the ballot box, either because of hostile laws or because of preju-
dice against them. Louis Lusky, who was Stone's law clerk when 
the footnote was written, differs somewhat from Ely in that he 
emphasizes the substantive side of the footnote, especially its 
role as a protection of minority rights. Nonetheless, he has pub-
lished two books arguing that Footnote Four has been used im-
properly by the Supreme Court as a roving commission for 
judicial activism. 
Lusky and Ely bring daunting credentials to the debate, and 
there can be no doubt that the footnote is, in part, concerned 
both with representation and with the protection of minorities. 
In rereading Stone's contemporaneous opinions and those of his 
colleagues, however, I have become convinced that the process-
based orientation underestimates the substantive content of the 
footnote, and that the revisionist attack on the "preferred posi-
tion" of non-economic rights needs to be refuted. The topic is 
much bigger than the Carolene Products footnote, and I expect 
to have more to say on it. This look at what Harlan Fiske Stone, 
Charles Evans Hughes, Wiley Rutledge and the other members 
of the Court said about Footnote Four in its early years is, how-
ever, a good place to start. 
I. CAROLENE PRODUCTS AND FOOTNOTE FOUR 
Carolene Products v. United States involved an attack on an 
old federal law forbidding the interstate shipment of something 
Footnote Four, that Stone "early took the view that the burden of proof in economic 
relations is on the one who contests constitutionality, whereas in civil liberties the burden 
of proof is shifted." Edwin Borchard, Book Review, 46 Colum. L Rev. 334, 336 (1946). 
Fifty years later, this question of the preferred position of individual rights to eco-
nomic rights, and the related issue whether this justifies finding unwritten rights in "fun-
damental" personal matters like sex, family and procreation, is still unresolved. It 
surfaced at the close of the past term of the Supreme Court in a caustic exchange between 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice John Paul Stevens in the important new takings case, 
Dolan v. City of 1igard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), with Rehnquist accusing Stevens of trying 
to relegate the Takings Qause of the Fifth Amendment "to the status of a poor relation" 
compared with the First or Fourth Amendments. ld. at 2320. While Carolene Products 
was not mentioned by name in Dolan, each of the opinions seemed well aware of it and of 
Footnote Four. See note 6 and accompanying text. 
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called "filled milk," a now-forgotten product that sounds some-
thing like liquid margarine that you were supposed to put in your 
coffee.4 One year earlier, in 1937, the Court had ended the New 
Deal constitutional crisis by adopting a deferential attitude to 
congressional and legislative regulation of business. In Carolene 
Products Justice Stone, speaking for the Court, rejected an attack 
on the rationality of the ban on filled milk, relying in part on 
Congress's findings and committee reports. He continued by 
stating a broad rule of deference: 
Even in the absence of such aids the existence of facts support-
ing the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory 
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to 
be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts 
made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as 
to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational 
basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.s 
This stated a basic presumption of constitutionality-at least "for 
regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transac-
tions."6 But at this point Stone affixed a footnote, numbered 
four, and reading, in its entirety, as follows: 
4. It is described in the opinion, quoting from congressional findings, as "milk com-
pounds made of condensed milk from which the butter fat has been extracted and an 
equivalent amount of vegetable oil, usually coconut oil, substituted." 304 U.S. 144, 149 
n.2. The underlying 1923 statute, the Filled Milk Act, is strongly criticized as special inter-
est legislation in Miller, The True Story ofCarolene Products, 1988 Sup. a. Rev. 3fJ7. In 
1972, after a district court held the Filled Milk Act unconstitutional as denying due pro-
cess, Milnot Co. v. Richardson, 350 F. Supp. 221 (S.D. Ill. 1m), the Food and Drug 
Administration abandoned both the appeal and the Filled Milk Act. Milnot Co. was the 
successor to Carolene Products Co., and the impetus for the changed judicial attitude was 
the government's different treatment of non-dairy creamers. See Frank R. Strong, A 
Post-Script to Carolene Products, 5 Const. Comm. 185 (1988). (Curiously, the product 
was, and apparently still is, called "Milnut," but the company's name is "Milnot.") 
5. 304 U.S. at 152. 
6. It was this basic presumption of constitutionality for legislation regulating busi-
ness that was at issue in Dolan, 114 S. a. 2309 (1994), and which led to the remarks 
quoted at the beginning of this article. Do/Qn was a takings case. The owner of a chain of 
hardware stores had been required to dedicate land for a bicycle path as a condition of a 
zoning variance permitting her to expand one of the stores. The majority held that the 
City had not carried the burden of showing that the bicycle path would actually carry 
some of the increased traffic created by the expansion. Chief Justice Rehnquist com-
mented that: 
Justice STEVENS' dissent relies upon a law review article for the proposition 
that the city's conditional demands for part of petitioner's property are "a spe-
cies of business regulation that heretofore warranted a strong presumption of 
constitutional validity" ... But simply denominating a governmental measure as 
a "business regulation" does not immunize it from constitutional challenge on 
the grounds that it violates a provision of the Bill of Rights. . . . We see no 
reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the 
Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be rele-
gated to the status of a poor relation in these comparable circumstances. 
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There may be narrower scope for operation of the pre-
sumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its 
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, 
such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed 
equally specific when held to be embraced within the 14th. 
See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-370; Lovell v. 
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452. 
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation 
which restricts those political processes, which can ordinarily 
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is 
to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the 
general prohibitions of the [14th] Amendment than are most 
other types of legislation. On restrictions upon the right to 
vote, see Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536; Nixon v. Condon, 
286 U.S. 73; on restraints upon the dissemination of informa-
tion, see Near v. Minnesota ex rei. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713-
714, 718-720, 722; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 
233; Lovell v. Griffin, supra; on interferences with political or-
ganizations, see Stromberg v. California, supra, 369; Fiske v. 
Kansas, 274 U.S. 380; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373-
378; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242; and see Holmes, J., in 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673; as to prohibition of 
peaceable assembly, see DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 
365. 
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter 
into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, or national, Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390; Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404; Farring-
ton v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, or racial minorities, Nixon v. 
Herdon, supra; Nixon v. Condon, supra: whether prejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condi-
tion, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect mi-
norities, and which may call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 
Wheat. 316, 428; South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 
177, 184, n.2, and cases cited.7 
114 S. Ct. at 2320 (internal citations omitted). Justice Stevens, joined in his dissent by 
Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg, responded: 
The city's conditions are by no means immune from constitutional scrutiny. The 
level of scrutiny, however, does not approximate the kind of review that would 
apply if the city had insisted on a surrender of Dolan's First Amendment rights 
in exchange for a building permit. 
I d. at 2328. Justice Souter, also in dissent, argued that the majority had placed the burden 
of producing evidence about the bicycle path on the city "despite the usual rule in cases 
involving the police power that the government is presumed to have acted constitution-
ally." ld. at 2331. 
7. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
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Thus, in broad terms the first paragraph deals with express rights, 
the second with the political process and the third with unpopu-
lar minorities. 
II. A THRICE-TOLD TALE: THE WRITING OF 
F001NOTE FOUR 
In his books, By What Right?s and Our Nine Tribunes9 and 
in a 1982 Columbia Law Review article, Footnote Redux: A 
Carolene Products Reminiscence,IO Professor Louis Lusky has 
described the process by which the footnote was created.n 
Harlan Fiske Stone had for many years been the Dean of Colum-
bia Law School and during his twenty-one years on the Supreme 
Court his clerkship generally went to Columbia's star graduate.tz 
During the 1937 Term Lusky was Stone's law clerk, and he wrote 
the first draft of the footnote.13 The first sentence of Lusky's 
original draft set its tone: 
Perhaps the attacking party bears a lighter burden where 
the effect of the statute may be to hamper the corrective polit-
ical processes which would ordinarily be expected to bring 
about repeal of unwise legislation.14 
8. Louis Lusky, By What Right?: A Commentary on the Supreme Coun's Power to 
Revise the Constitution 108-14 (Michie, 1975). 
9. Louis Lusky, Our Nine Tribunes: The Supreme Coun in Modern America 119-32 
(Praeger Publishers, 1993). 
10. Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carotene Products Reminiscence, 82 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1093 (1982). 
11. Still earlier, Alpheus T. Mason had given a similar but less detailed version, 
based on correspondence with Lusky. See A.T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone Pillar of the 
Law 513-16 (Viking Press, 1956). Lusky expanded his version in By What Right? (cited in 
note 8), and in 82 Colum. L. Rev. (cited in note 10), which has appended to it correspon-
dence between Stone and Chief Justice Hughes and a note from Hugo Black to Stone. 
Lusky's newest version, in Our Nine Tribunes (cited in note 9), is essentially that of Foot-
Mte Redux with fewer footnotes, but in addition to the correspondence Lusky appended 
copies of the original drafts. The versions are all consistent, but the two recent ones are 
more useful, particularly the appendix to Our Nine Tribunes at 177-90. 
My description is based directly upon the documents in the appendix to Our Nine 
Tribunes unless attributed to Lusky himself. 
12. Among them were Walter Gellhom, Herbert Wechsler, Alfred McCormack, 
Milton Handler, Harold Leventhal, Alexis Coudert, and Eugene Nickerson . A complete 
list appears in Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone at 875 (cited in note 11). On the experience, 
see Alfred McCormack, A Law Clerk's Recollections, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 710 (1946). 
13. In his most recent version Lusky reports that he had been assigned to read the 
printer's proof on Justice Stone's draft of the Carolene Products opinion, and, working 
into the night, wrote Footnote Four and was so pleased with his handiwork that he nearly 
had it set in type, until dissuaded by his fellow clerk, Harold Leventhal, later a distin-
guished federal judge. Lusky, Our Nine Tribunes at 177-78 (cited in note 9). 
14. ld. at 183, 185. 
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Stone struck this out,1s but did write a footnote that kept most of 
Lusky's ideas and most of the remainder of Lusky's draft.l6 
Stone then circulated his printed draft of the Carolene opinion, 
with a footnote four that was substantially similar to what be-
came the second and third paragraphs in the finished product. In 
place of Lusky's opening, Stone began: 
Different considerations may apply, and one attacking the 
constitutionality of a statute may be thought to bear a lighter 
burden, when the legislation aims at restricting the corrective 
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring 
about repeal of undesirable legislation.17 
Like Lusky's draft, Stone's draft suggested the appropriateness 
of closer judicial scrutiny when there was a failure of "corrective 
political processes," either through restrictions on political activ-
ity or becm~se of prejudice against "discrete and insular minori-
ties" who would thus not be able to use the political processes. 
When Stone circulated the draft, Chief Justice Hughes re-
sponded with a very basic objection: 
I am somewhat disturbed by your Note 4 . . . . Is it true 
that "different considerations" apply in the instances you men-
tion? Are the "considerations" different or does the differ-
ence lie not in the test but in the nature of the right involved? 
When we say that a statute is invalid on its face, do we not 
mean that, in relation to the right invoked against it, the legis-
lative action raises no presumption in its favor and has no ra-
tional support? Thus, in dealing with freedom of speech and 
of the press, as in the recent Lovell case, the legislative action 
putting the press broadly under license and censorship is di-
rectly opposed to the constitutional guaranty and for that rea-
son has no presumption to support it. .. ,18 
Stone replied to Hughes on the next day and said that he 
had revised the footnote "[i]n view of your letter."I9 The rest of 
Stone's letter gives us insight into his thinking: 
15. Id. at 185. 
16. Id. at 186. Lusky added the famous "discrete and insular minorities" language 
to Stone's draft and Stone included it in the later versions. Id. 
17. Id. at 187. 
18. Letter from Charles Evans Hughes to Harlan Fiske Stone, April 18, 1938, re-
printed in Lusky, Our Nine Tribunes at 179 (cited in note 9); Lusky, 82 Col urn. L. Rev. at 
1106 (cited in note 10). The Lovell case is Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), one of 
Hughes's great First Amendment opinions. 
19. Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Charles Evans Hughes, April 19, 1938, re-
printed in Lusky, Our Nine Tribunes at 180 (cited in note 9); Lusky, 82 Colurn. L Rev. at 
1107 (cited in note 10). 
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You are quite right in saying that the specific prohibitions 
of the first ten amendments and the same prohibitions when 
adopted by the Fourteenth Amendment leave no opportunity 
for presumption of constitutionality where statutes on their 
face violate the prohibition. There are, however, possible re-
straints on liberty and political rights which do not fall within 
those specific prohibitions and are forbidden only by the gen-
eral words of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. I wish to avoid the possibility of having what I 
have written in the body of the opinion about the presumption 
of constitutionality in the ordinary run of due process cases 
applied as a matter of course to those other more exceptional 
cases. For that reason it seemed to me desirable to file a ca-
veat in the note, without, however, committing the Court to 
any proposition contained in it. The notion that the Court 
should be more alert to protect constitutional rights in those 
cases where there is danger that the ordinary political 
processes for the correction of undesirable legislation may not 
operate has been announced for the Court by many judges 
.••. 20 
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Stone then made three major changes: he added the first 
paragraph of Footnote Four, he substituted "[t]here may be nar-
rower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutional-
ity" for the earlier discussion of burdens of proof, and he made 
somewhat clearer the tentative nature of his comments ("[i]t is 
unnecessary to consider now whether," "[n]or need we enquire 
whether"). While both Lewis Powe1121 and Lusky himself22 have 
made much of the tentative nature of the footnote, I will show 
below that Stone and his contemporaries on the Court several 
times treated Footnote Four as stating a positive, not tentative, 
thesis, and one that dealt not merely with process but with sub-
stantive constitutional rights. 
20. Lusky, Our Nine Tribunes at 180 (cited in note 9); Lusky, 82 Colum. L Rev. at 
1107 (cited in note 10). In the remainder of the paragraph Stone gave the examples of 
Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland and cases collected in his footnote 2 in 
South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros, 303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938). Both citations were already in 
the draft he had circulated and both appear in the third paragraph of the final version of 
Footnote Four. (Incidentally, Professor Lusky also drafted the BarnweU footnote, which 
certainly can be seen today as a lineal ancestor of Footnote Four.) 
21. Lewis F. Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1087, 1090-92 
(1982). See also Mason, Harlan Fzske Stone at 513 n.• (cited in note 11). 
22. Lusky, Our Nine Tribunes at 125-26 (cited in note 9); Lusky, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 
at 1098-99 (cited in note 10). 
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Lusky has clearly been annoyed these many years at what he 
sees as Hughes's meddling with an elegant and limitable system 
based only on the need for judicial protection of the political pro-
cess and minority rights. In a 1942 Yale Law Journal article dis-
cussion of Footnote Four, Judicial Protection of Minority 
Rights,23 he did not even mention the first paragraph, and in his 
1975 book, By What Right? he described the footnote as contain-
ing "the germs of two distinct theories for expanding the Court's 
protection of individual freedoms and immunities. "24 One is a 
principle of implied judicial power. He describes it, approvingly, 
in speaking of Stone's circulated draft: 
Justice Stone points to two situations in which legislative mis-
calculations of the public welfare are likely to remain uncor-
rected unless the Court steps in. One is that where a 
legislature insulates itself from demands for change in the law 
by hampering political expression, political organization, or 
voting. The other is where, although the political processes 
are fully operative, prejudice against socially isolated minori-
ties may render the legislature unresponsive to their 
grievances.25 
In contrast, he described Hughes's position as a thought that 
"some rights are more important than others, that ... they oc-
cupy a 'preferred position' .... "26 According to Lusky, when 
Stone added the first paragraph ("and won the Chief Justice's 
concurrence"27), he made a grave change in the footnote, "quite 
foreign to the principle of implied judicial power":28 
The Court's authority to override policies approved by legisla-
tures depends, says this paragraph, not on its special fitness for 
particular tasks, but on two other circumstances: the words of 
the Constitution, and the Court's election to apply them in a 
way the Constitutors did not expect .... In effect, the position 
is that the Court is licensed to disregard the fundamental prin-
ciple of interpretation (which is to give words the meaning 
23. 52 Yale LJ. 1, 19-21 (1942). Lusky has written that he concentrated on the third 
paragraph because he was about to go overseas and perceived that the third paragraph 
"had not been accepted by the Court." To remedy this he "wrote an article explaining the 
background and conceptual underpinning of the footnote, with special emphasis on para-
graph 3." Lusky, Our Nine Tribunes at 131 (cited in note 9). 
24. Lusky, By What Right? at 111 (cited in note 8). 
25. ld. at 109-110. 
26. Id. at 110 (emphasis in original). 
27. ld. 
28. Id. at 111. 
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their authors would have given them in the context of the in-
stant case) whenever the Court thinks a different meaning 
would better serve the public welfare.29 
285 
This led to massive expansions of judicial power in areas like 
criminal procedure,30 speech and press31 and church-state rela-
tions.32 Most seriously to Lusky, it led to the concept of funda-
mental rights, which he attributes to the first paragraph, and 
abhors.33 Recently, in Our Nine Tribunes, Lusky has expanded 
his criticism to all judicial activism34 that cannot be tied to inter-
ference with the political process or discrimination against racial, 
religious and ethnic groups.3s 
IV. REPRESENTATION REINFORCEMENT 
Underlying the modem debate over Footnote Four is the 
question of the role of original intent in constitutional law. 
Under the rubric "interpretivism," this was the hot topic of the 
mid-seventies and early eighties, though eventually most consti-
tutional scholars grew bored and agreed with Paul Brest36 that it 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 161-66, 331-34. 
31. Id. at 319-30. 
32. Id. at 167. 
33. See id. at 311-14. See also Lusky, Our Nine Tribunes at 76-86 (cited in note 9) 
(discussion of "neo-privacy"). In a letter that he sent me Lusky wrote: 
As I have tried to make clear, my trouble with the "preferred position" doctrine 
is not that it can be and has been [able] to reach a sound result in some cases, but 
that it is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive, and therefore proved to be 
unhelpful in distinguishing between areas where the Court should assume pri-
mary responsibility and areas where it should not. In other words, I think it 
announces unsound doctrine . ... 
34. I do not wish to overstate Lusky's opposition to judicial activism. He describes 
"activism" as "readiness to invent new constitutional rules not directly derivable from the 
text of the Constitution," and says that what he sees as a "shift toward 'activism' " has had 
beneficial consequences, "but, because of the manner in which the Court has brought it 
about, it has also damaged the Court and the institution of judicial review over which it 
presides." Lusky, Our Nine Tribunes at 13 (cited in note 9). He contends that his new 
book is an attempt to find "a set of limiting principles that will preserve judicial review by 
stopping its excesses." I d. 
35. Id. at 132. Lusky complains that the term "discrete and insular minorities" has 
been given too expansive a meaning, and insists that it should be limited to the three 
categories mentioned in paragraph three. On the page just cited he chides Justice Lewis 
Powell for including aliens within it in his article on Footnote Four. (Whether Powell 
actually says this isn't clear, see Powell, 82 Colum. L. Rev. at 1090-91 (cited in note 21)). 
Lusky also writes that among the "latter-day misconceptions" about the footnote 
is that it demands judicial remedies for aU chronic losers in the political arena, 
while still other misconceptions involve various novel meanings of "discrete and 
insular": meanings not to be found in any dictionary, as far as I am aware. 
Id. at 131. 
36. See Paul Brest, 1M Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. 
L. Rev. 204 (1980). 
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was a pretty phony issue: The obvious answer was that "intent of 
the framers" is surely relevant, but hardly should bind the courts 
hundreds of years later, since a) we rarely know the original in-
tent very clearly; b) times change and people writing constitu-
tions know that and expect their product to be used in 
unirnagined contexts; c) it's not that clear who "the framers" re-
ally were, given collective authorship and elaborate ratification 
processes; and d) it's even less clear why some men who died 
long ago should bind us today at all; none of us were there, and 
even if our ancestors were, many of them were excluded from the 
electoral process.37 Today, the term "originalist" seems to have 
replaced the awkward "interpretivist," and while the debate has 
become muted, there still is a continuum of approaches to consti-
tutional interpretation. Lusky's discussion of the first paragraph 
of Footnote Four shows him to be a pretty strict originalist, 
though he claims to reject the more extreme forms of interpretiv-
ism, and agrees that " 'intent' has no simple and understandable 
referent."38 Some others are still at the other end of the spec-
trum,39 but today, most writers are somewhere in the middle. 
The best known middle of the road theory, and one of the 
dominant constitutional theories of this generation, is that of rep-
resentation-reinforcement, put forth by John Hart Ely, most no-
tably in his influential book, Democracy and Distrust. 4o The first 
part of Ely's book is spent on a paradox: he feels obliged to reject 
interpretivism,4I but scorns the ability of courts to discover fun-
37. This is my restatement, but Brest said most of this fifteen years ago. See Brest, 
60 B.U. L. Rev. 204 (cited in note 36). And sixty years before that, Cardozo had written: 
The great generalities of the constitution have a content and a significance that 
vary from age to age. The method of free decision sees through the transitory 
particulars and reaches what is permanent behind them. Interpretation, thus 
enlarged, becomes more than the ascertainment of the meaning and intent of 
lawmakers whose collective will has been declared. It supplements the declara-
tion, and fills the vacant spaces, by the same processes and methods that have 
built up the customary law. Codes and other statutes may threaten the judicial 
function with repression and disuse and atrophy. The function flourishes and 
persists by virtue of the human need to which it steadfastly responds. Justinian's 
prohibition of any commentary on the product of his codifiers is remembered 
only for its futility. 
Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 17-18 (Yale U. Press, 1921). 
38. Lusky, By What Right? at 46 (cited in note 8); Lusky, Our Nine Tribunes at 133-
40 (cited in note 9). 
39. See, e.g., Stanley FtSh, Working On the Chain Gang, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 551, 562 
(1982). Stanley Fish's theory is too subtle to categorize as merely non-interpretive, but he 
occupies a position far to one side of the debate. 
40. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 73-116 (Harv. U. Press, 1980). In a 
real sense, the final two-thirds of Ely's book is about representation-reinforcement, id. at 
73-183. 
41. His first two chapters are entitled "The Allure of Interpretivism" and "The Im-
possibility of a Clause-Bound Interpretivism," id. at 1-9, 11-41. 
1995] CAROLENE PRODUCTS 287 
damental unwritten values in constitutionallaw.42 Thus, he can-
not accept the rigid interpretivism associated with Raoul 
Berger43 or Robert Bork,44 but also rejects the non-interpretivist 
view4s as too free-wheeling. His solution is his representation-
reinforcement theory. 
Ely argued that judicial review is most justifiable when 
speech, political involvement or the political process itself is re-
stricted in ways that deny voters the ability to use the democratic 
majoritarian process to effect change. In this circumstance judi-
cial review reinforces representation and thus majority rule, in-
stead of running counter to it. Footnote Four, or more 
accurately, its second and third paragraphs, are the major source 
of Ely's theory.46 Building on Lusky's discussion in By What 
Right?, Ely describes the first paragraph as "pure interpretiv-
ism,"47 and seems to read it as claiming only the power to en-
force the literal words of the Constitution, particularly express 
prohibitions on government conduct.48 He goes on to describe 
paragraphs two and three as "more interesting,"49 and devotes 
the rest of his book to applying them to judicial review. 
42. Id. at 43-72. 
43. See Raoul Berger, Government By Judiciary: The Transformation of the Four-
teenth Amendment 363-72 (Harv. U. Press, 1977). 
44. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the 
Law 143-60 (The Free Press, 1990). 
45. See Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, The Courts, and Human Rights: An In-
quiry into the Legitimacy of Constitutional Policymaking by the Judiciary 101-02 (Yale U. 
Press, 1982). Perry has somewhat tempered his views in more recent times. See Michael 
J. Perry, Morality, Politics, and Law: A Bicentennial Essay 132 (Oxford U. Press, 1988). 
46. See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 73-77 (cited in note 40). 
47. Id. at 76. 
48. This puts Ely somewhat at odds with Lusky, whose main complaint is that the 
first paragraph cannot be so narrowly brigaded. See Lusky, By What Right? at 111 (cited 
in note 8) (emphasis added): 
If the Constitution contains a "specific prohibition" against Federal action, such 
as the First Amendment ban on abridgement of speech and press, that prohibi-
tion will also be enforced against state action if it is "held to be embraced within 
the Fourteenth." For all that appears, the Court claims unrestrained authority to 
decide whether or not it is to be so held; no objective standard is prescribed for 
the Court's guidance. In effect, the position is that the Court is licensed to disre-
gard the fundamental principle of interpretation (which is to give words the mean-
ing their authors would have given them in the context of the instant case) 
whenever the Court thinks a different meaning would better serve the public 
welfare . 
. . . There is virtually no limit to its ability to attribute new meaning to the 
"specific prohibitions," once it is liberated from the need to interpret them as 
the Constitutors [sic] expected. 
49. Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 76 (cited in note 40). 1\vo leading articles of 
recent years, both critical of the Footnote, have concerned themselves almost exclusively 
with the third paragraph. See Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. 
Rev. 713 (1985); Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the "Inside-Outsider," 
134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1291 (1986). In addition, Lawrence Tribe used the second and third 
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I suggest that the first paragraph of the footnote has been 
undervalued, and Stone's own writings, particularly his dissents· 
in Minersville School District v. GobitisSO and Jones v. Opelika,st 
and his concurrence in Skinner v. Oklahoma52 show that there 
was much more to the footnote than just representation-rein-
forcement or even the protection of minority rights. 
IV. WHAT JUSTICE STONE SAID 
Gobitis involved a group of Jehovah's Witness children who 
refused to salute the flag as part of their daily classroom routine. 
They were expelled from school, and brought suit for reinstate-
ment. The Court of Appeals held for them, but the Supreme 
Court reversed by an 8-1 vote. The majority opinion was by Fe-
lix Frankfurter, who saw the issue primarily as a religious group's 
demand for an exemption from a general public duty.53 He 
briefly considered freedom of speech, but dismissed it quickly be-
cause there was a rational basis-the instilling of patriotism in 
time of world war-for the school board's requirement; no more 
was needed: 
Except where the transgression of constitutional liberty is too 
plain for argument, personal freedom is best maintained-so 
long as the remedial channels of the democratic process remain 
open and unobstructed-when it is ingrained in a people's 
habits and not enforced against popular policy by the coercion 
of adjudicated law.54 
To this Frankfurter attached a footnote citing the leading cases in 
which speech and assembly rights had been upheld to that date, 
and commented that in those cases "the Court was concerned 
with restrictions cutting off appropriate means through which, in 
a free society, the processes of popular rule may effectively func-
tion. "55 These are particularly interesting, since they presage Ely 
by forty years, but convey a similar interpretation of Stone's 
Footnote Four.s6 
paragraphs as a starting point in his attack on process-based theories. See Lawrence 
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale W. 
1063, 1063 n.1 (1980). 
50. 310 u.s. 586 (1940). 
51. 316 u.s. 584 (1942). 
52. 316 u.s. 535 (1942). 
53. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594. 
54. Id. at 599 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). 
55. Id. at 599 n. 6. 
56. 
The swift imprimatur on Paragraph 2 is amply shown by reference to a single 
remarkable fact. In June 1940, when Stone stood alone in the first FliJg Salute 
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Stone, however, was not convinced, and dissented-alone.57 
Throughout his discussion ran two themes: that "the explicit 
guaranties of freedom of speech and religion" cannot be overrid-
den by a legislative command of "compulsory expressions of loy-
alty,"5s and that the rights of small minorities cannot be 
overridden by legislative judgments, even if backed by the bulk 
of the population,59 and even if they are reasonable means to the 
end of national unity.60 Stone responded directly to the Frank-
furter language quoted above when he wrote, in a paragraph ex-
pressly citing Footnote Four, that "I am not persuaded that we 
should refrain from passing upon the legislative judgment 'as 
long as the remedial channels of the democratic process remain 
open and unobstructed.' This seems to me no less than the sur-
render of the constitutional protection of the liberty of small mi-
norities to the popular will. "61 
To be sure, Stone focused in part on what he called at one 
point "the right of this small and helpless minority,"62 and his 
concern for them can, as Lusky suggests63, be bottomed on the 
third paragraph. But it also appears that Stone was looking to 
the First Amendment itself: 
The Constitution expresses more than the conviction of 
the people that democratic processes must be preserved at all 
costs. It is also an expression of faith and a command that 
freedom of mind and spirit must be preserved, which govern-
ment must obey, if it is to adhere to that justice and modera-
tion without which no free government can exist. For this 
reason it would seem that legislation which operates to repress 
the religious freedom of small minorities, which is admittedly 
within the scope of the protection of the Bill of Rights, must at 
Case-explicitly relying upon Paragraph 3-Frankfurter, for the Court, tacitly 
but unmistakably invoked the logic of Paragraph 2. 
Lusky, Our Nine Tribunes at 130 (cited in note 9) (emphasis in original). 
57. Gobitis, 301 U.S. at 601. Justice McReynolds noted a concurrence in result. Id. 
58. Id. at 605. 
59. Id. at 604-07. 
60. "The very terms of the Bill of Rights preclude, it seems to me, any reconciliation 
of such compulsions with the constitutional guaranties by a legislative declaration that 
they are more important to the public welfare than the Bill of Rights." ld. at 605. 
61. Id. at 605-06. 
62. Id. at 606. 
63. Lusky, By What Right? at 267 (cited in note 8): 
This time, however, there was a vigorous though solitary dissent by Justice 
Stone, who invoked the principle articulated in the third paragraph of his 1938 
Carotene Products footnote: "more searching judicial scrutiny" of statutes di-
rected against (or, more precisely, in this case, failing to accommodate the needs 
of) "discrete and insular minorities." 
See also the passage quoted in note 56, supra. 
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least be subject to the same judicial scrutiny as legislation 
which we have recently held to infringe the constitutional lib-
erty of religious and racial minorities.64 
Stone's Gobitis dissent shows that he was not prepared to rely 
only on process defects or discrimination to justify constitutional 
activism by the Court. He read the Bill of Rights itself as a char-
ter for judicial activism. 
In 1942, two years after Gobitis, the Court decided Jones v. 
Opelika,6s another of the many Jehovah's Witnesses cases that 
pushed the civil liberties envelope in the late thirties and early 
forties. Jones involved several municipalities' attempts to require 
street or door-to-door sellers of religious literature to pay for 
peddlers' licenses. The majority, in an opinion by Justice Stanley 
Reed, rejected the defendants' First Amendment claims "be-
cause we view these sales as partaking more of commercial than 
religious or educational transactions."66 The majority noted that 
none of the taxes or license fees had been aimed at the Jehovah's 
Witnesses or at religious or ideological publications.67 
Stone, now Chief Justice, dissented in an opinion joined by 
Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy. While he did not mention 
the Carolene Products footnote, Stone wrote words that many 
associated with the first paragraph of Footnote Four: 
The First Amendment is not confined to safeguarding 
freedom of speech and freedom of religion against discrimina-
tory attempts to wipe them out. On the contrary, the Consti-
tution, by virtue of the Frrst and the Fourteenth Amendments, 
has put those freedoms in a preferred position.68 
Stone's dissent is of some embarrassment to the Lusky position 
on two accounts: Stone here coined the phrase "preferred posi-
tion," and his words show that he did not limit the presumption 
of unconstitutionality to the discriminations and interferences 
within the political process, that he took the first paragraph seri-
64. 310 U.S. at 606-07. The reference to recent holdings is presumably to three 
cases that Stone cited in the preceding paragraph, which also cited Footnote Four and is 
clearly concerned with "discrete and insular minorities." The cases are Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and Farring· 
ton v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). Each of these cases is cited in the third paragraph 
of Footnote Four. Thus, what Stone seems to be saying is that a claim under the First 
Amendment is entitled to the same judicial protection and activism as a claim that the 
political process does not protect a discrete and insular minority. 
65. 316 u. s. 584 (1942). 
66. Id. at 598. 
67. Id. at 596-98. 
68. Id. at 608 (dissenting opinion). 
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ously.69 This is pointed up by his concurrence in Skinner v. 
Oklahoma,?o decided one week before Jones v. Opelika. 
Skinner is largely remembered today as a way station to the 
right of privacy, and it is Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court 
that is usually discussed. In some ways. however, Stone's concur-
rence is more interesting, especially since he refers to Footnote 
Four and the reference is central to his opinion. 
Skinner involved an Oklahoma eugenics statute that re-
quired involuntary sterilization of "habitual criminals." Justice 
Douglas treated the case as one involving equal protection. 
Those convicted of white collar crimes like embezzlement were 
excluded from the definition of habitual criminal, while those 
committing similar crimes like larceny were included. Because 
the legislation involved "one of the basic civil rights of man,"n 
because "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very 
existence and survival of the race,"n strict scrutiny of the classifi-
cation was required. This led Douglas to the conclusion that the 
classification was an invidious discrimination, and thus had to be 
struck down. 
Stone concurred in result, but rejected the use of the Equal 
Protection Clause, saying that the question was not one of equal 
protection, but "whether the wholesale condemnation of a class 
to such an invasion of personal liberty, without opportunity to 
any individual to show that his is not the type of case which 
would justify resort to it, satisfies the demands of due process."73 
that 
There are limits to the extent to which the presumption of 
constitutionality can be pressed, especially where the liberty of 
the person is concerned (see United States v. Carotene Prod-
ucts [citing Footnote Four]) and where the presumption is re-
sorted to only to dispense with a procedure which the ordinary 
dictates of prudence would seem to demand for the protection 
of the individual from arbitrary action.74 
69. Lusky admitted this in By What Right? at 313 (cited in note 8). He has written 
Stone himself, though he was as dedicated to sound doctrine as any Supreme 
Court Justice who ever sat, was primarily a fighter for decisions he thought were 
correct. When endeavoring to win over his colleagues on an issue he deemed 
important, he was a redoubtable advocate; he threw at the opposition whatever 
he thought would be most effective (including the Footnote). 
Lusky, Our Nine Tribunes at 126 (cited in note 9). 
70. 316 u.s. 535 (1942). 
71. 316 U.S. at 541. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 544. 
74. ld. 
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Stone said that because Skinner was not given an individualized 
hearing on the inheritability of his criminal tendencies, he had 
been denied procedural due process.7s 
This fits neither in paragraph two (no one seemed to bear-
guing that habitual criminals fit there because they were denied 
the right to vote) nor paragraph three (habitual criminals, at least 
in 1942, were not viewed as a religious, racial, national or other 
kind of discrete and insular minority76). The only reason that 
Skinner would be entitled to an individualized hearing was that a 
personal liberty was affected, a liberty not expressly mentioned 
in the Constitution, yet one that Stone found to be within the 
ideas that he had put forward in Footnote Four. Stone made no 
effort to explain where this "liberty of the person" came from. 
He seemed to have considered it self-evident that taking away 
someone's ability to have children invaded it, and his citation of 
Footnote Four suggests that he was prepared to derive substan-
tive unwritten fundamental rights from the "specific provisions in 
the Constitution" that he had referred to in the first paragraph of 
Footnote Four.77 
V. THE OTHER JUSTICES 
As far as I can tell, that exhausts Stone's judicial references 
to Footnote Four,1s but there were several other references by 
fellow justices in and near his lifetime. Stone was not always on 
the same side as the justice citing the footnote, so we cannot au-
75. ld. at 545. The majority did not reach this question. Id. at 538. 
76. Today, of course, we might note that a disproportionate number of habitual 
criminals are non-white. 
77. It must be noted that Stone was not saying that no one might be sterilized invol-
untarily. Neither he nor Justice Douglas reached the question whether a better drafted 
sterilization law would be constitutional. Nonetheless, Stone's approach seems to presage 
Justice Douglas's later concept of penumbras of the Bill of Rights, put forth in Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the well-spring of modem privacy doctrine. 
Another concurrence, by Justice Jackson, though it did not mention Footnote Four, 
made an argument that did make reference to the majoritarian process: 
There are limits to the extent to which a legislatively represented majority may 
conduct biological experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality and 
natural powers of a minority-even those who have been guilty of what the 
majority define as crimes. 
Id. at 546. 
78. In another case he cited the text to which the footnote is attached for the propo-
sition that the Court must assume any state of facts which would sustain a statute assailed 
as unconstitutional. Alabama Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450,466 (1945). 
Contrast the Rehnquist position in Dolan v. City of Tigard, cited in notes 3 and 6. McAd-
ory involved state labor restrictions attacked as preempted by the federal labor laws and 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The Court, per Stone, rejected both argu-
ments and dismissed the writ of certiorari because the case was deemed unripe for the 
requested declaratory judgment. 
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tomatically assume that he would have agreed, but in none of the 
cases did Stone note any disagreement with the dicta about Foot-
note Four. 
The first use of Footnote Four by the Court came in Thorn-
hill v. Alabama,79 a 1940 case that struck down an Alabama stat-
ute restricting labor picketing. Frank Murphy, writing for an 
eight-justice majority that included Stone, cited the footnote for 
the importance of free speech to the processes of popular gov-
ernment, a proposition squarely within its second paragraph.so 
In the 1944 case of Prince v. Massachusetts, however, Murphy 
cited it in dissent for the lack of "any strong presumption" of 
constitutionality in dealing with statutes "which directly or indi-
rectly infringe religious freedom,"sl a reading that seems to rely 
on the first paragraph. Felix Frankfurter also seemed to be refer-
ring to the first paragraph when he cited the footnote in 1941 to 
support his statement that the right to free discussion is a right 
"to be guarded with a jealous eye."82 But in his 1943 dissent in 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bamette,83 which over-
ruled his opinion in Gobitis, Frankfurter gave it a crabbed read-
ing: "This Court has recognized, what hardly could be denied, 
that all the provisions of the first ten Amendments are 'specific' 
prohibitions [citing Footnote Four]."84 
Of the Justices who sat with Stone during his lifetime it was 
Wiley Rutledge who used the footnote most clearly to support 
the preferred position concept.ss Thomas v. ColJins86 involved a 
79. 310 u.s. 88 (1940). 
80. Abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press, however, impairs those 
opportunities for public education that are essential to effective exercise of the 
power of correcting error through the processes of popular government. Com-
pare United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153n. 
310 U.S. at 95. The opinion also owes an (unstated) debt to the famous Brandeis concur-
rence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373-78 (1927), which is cited in the second 
paragraph of Footnote Four. 
81. 321 U.S. 158, 173 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). Prince involved the applica-
tion of the child labor laws to children selling Jehovah's Witnesses literature, and Stone 
was in the majority of five, which found that the state's power to forbid child labor out-
weighed both the parental rights and the child's own religious rights. The case was diffi-
cult for Justices who had only recently helped win the fight to uphold the child labor laws, 
and the lineup defies any easy political or activist classification. The majority opinion, 
upholding the restriction, was by Wiley Rutledge, joined by Stone, Black, Reed and 
Douglas. Murphy's dissent was joined by Justices Jackson, Roberts and Frankfurter. 
82. American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325 (1941). 
83. 319 u.s. 624, 646 (1943). 
84. Id. at 648. 
85. Rutledge had been appointed in 1942 to replace James F. Byrnes, a conservative 
New Dealer who sat on the Court for just over a year. The story of the maneuvering over 
the vacancy is told in Chapter XIII of Gerald Gunther's biography of Learned Hand. 
Gunther, Learned Hand at 553-70 (cited in note 3). There was a massive behind the 
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Texas law requiring union organizers to register with the state 
before soliciting members. Thomas, a union executive, had been 
enjoined, ex parte, from soliciting members without first ob-
taining an organizer's card; he deliberately violated the injunc-
tion, was held in contempt, sought habeas corpus, and was 
vindicated by a 5-4 majority in an opinion by Rutledge, with 
Stone joining in a dissent by Owen Roberts. Texas argued that it 
was doing nothing more than regulating a line of work-union 
organizer-much as it regulated securities salesmen, insurance 
agents, real estate brokers and the like.87 Rutledge described the 
issue this way: 
The case confronts us again with the duty our system 
places on this Court to say where the individual's freedom 
ends and the State's power begins. Choice on that border, 
now as always delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual 
presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the pre-
ferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensa-
ble democratic freedoms secured by the Frrst Amendment. 
["Cf." citation to three Frrst Amendment cases.] That priority 
gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting 
dubious intrusions. And it is the character of the right, not of 
the limitation, which determines what standard governs the 
choice. Compare United States v. Carolene Products, .... ss 
scenes campaign in favor of Hand, at least partially orchestrated by Frankfurter. One of 
the major factors against Hand was his age-he was nearly 71 and Roosevelt had at-
tempted in the Court-Packing Scheme to pressure Justices into retiring at 70. But another 
was that he was viewed as a potential ally of Frankfurter's in the increasingly acrimonious 
split among the Roosevelt appointees into a liberal/activist camp and a more conservative 
one led by Frankfurter. As Gunther puts it, 
Frankfurter was correct in anticipating that FOR's selection of Byrnes's suc-
cessor would be critical. Rutledge was a solid vote to join the Black-Douglas-
Murphy-Stone side; Hand, by contrast, would probably have sided with Frank-
furter on the civil liberties issues dividing the New Deal Court. Although a life-
long believer in the First Amendment, he, like Frankfurter, generally refused to 
embrace a double standard, a more interventionist judicial stance toward "per-
sonal" rights than to "property" ones. 
Id. at 565. 
In a memorial to Stone, Chief Justice Stone's Conception of the Judicial Function, 46 
Colum. L. Rev. 696, 698 (1946), reprinted in Irving Dilliard, ed., Learned Hand, The Spirit 
of Liberty 201, 206 (U. of Chi. Press, 1977), Hand argued that Stone bad rejected the 
preferred position approach: "He could not understand bow the principle [of judicial def-
erence to the legislature] which be bad all along supported, could mean that, when con-
cerned with interests other than property, the courts should have a wider latitude for 
enforcing their own predilections, than when they were concerned with property itself." 
Gunther comments that "the views Hand here ascribed to Stone were more truly his 
own." Gunther, supra, at 565 n. •. 
86. 323 u.s. 516 (1945). 
87. Id. at 525. 
88. Id. at 529-30. The cases cited in the "cf." citation were Schneider v. Stille, 308 
U.S. 147 (1939), which struck down an anti-leafleting law; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
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Rutledge also made clear that the freedoms of speech and assem-
bly were not limited to their instrumental value in the electoral 
process: "The grievances for redress of which the right of petition 
was insured, and with it the right of assembly, are not solely reli-
gious or political ones. And the rights of free speech and a free 
press are not confined to any field of human interest."89 Rut-
ledge applied the clear and present danger test and easily found 
the state's actions unconstitutional. 
The Roberts dissent, joined by Stone, Reed and Frankfurter, 
began with a strong defense of freedom of speech,90 but denied 
that it applied in the circumstances of the case, which it saw as a 
business regulation, the business of unions being organizing.91 
Like the application of the child labor laws to itinerant sellers of 
Jehovah's Witness literature in Prince v. Massachusetts, Thomas 
v. Collins involved a close question that could divide even jus-
tices with a strong commitment to the Frrst Amendment, so one 
cannot tell if Stone disagreed with Rutledge's dictum as well as 
with his holding. Given Stone's creation of the preferred posi-
tion concept in Jones v. Opelika less than three years earlier, 
however, it seems likely that he would have agreed with Rut-
ledge's statement of the preferred position of free speech, 
although dissenting from its application.92 
U.S. 296 (1940), which struck down a requirement of a permit for a Jehovah's Witnesses 
parade-rally; and Prince v. Massachusetts, supra note 81, which upheld the application of 
child labor laws to young sellers of Jehovah's Witness literature. The citation to Carolene 
Products does not actually mention Footnote Four, but cites 304 U.S. 152-153, the pages 
on which the footnote appears. Pretty clearly Justice Rutledge was referring both to text 
and the footnote. 
89. Id. at 531. 
90. The right to express thoughts freely and to disseminate ideas fully is secured 
by the Constitution as basic to the conception of our government. A long series 
of cases has applied these fundamental rights in a great variety of circumstances. 
Id. at 548 (footnote omitted). 
91. Id. at 556-57. 
92. In the course of the dissent, which Stone joined, Justice Roberts clearly rejected 
an argument that he puts in Thomas's mouth as follows: 
He asserts that, under the Constitutional guarantees, there is a sharp distinction 
between business rights and civil rights; that in discussion of labor problems, and 
equally in solicitation of union membership, civil rights are exercised; ... and 
that, consequently, any interference with the right to solicit membership in such 
organizations is a prohibited abridgement of these rights, even though the Act 
applies only to paid organizers. 
I d. at 552 (emphasis in the original). I suppose that this could be read as a rejection of the 
preferred position concept, but it seems more an argument that labor unions were not 
immune to the regulations of business speech that had been upheld in cases like Valentine 
v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Compare Justice Jackson's concurrence in Thomas, 
323 U.S. at 544, 548, in which he complains about the less protective First Amendment 
treatment that the Court had given to employers. 
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Stone died on April 22, 1946.93 Rutledge cited Footnote 
Four, coupled with Thomas v. Collins, twice in separate opinions 
in the next two years. In February of 1947 Rutledge dissented in 
the bedrock establishment of religion case, Everson v. Board of 
Education,94 joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton. 
In a footnote near the end of his opinion Rutledge wrote: 
In Thomas v. Collins . . . it was said that the preferred 
place given in our scheme to the great democratic freedoms 
secured by the Frrst Amendment gives them "a sanctity and a 
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." Cf. Remon-
strance. . . . And in other cases it has been held that the usual 
presumption of constitutionality will not work to save such 
legislative excursions in this field. [Citing Footnote Four.)95 
And in June of 1948 Rutledge, in a concurrence joined by Black, 
Douglas, and Murphy, cited Footnote Four, Thomas v. Collins, 
Thornhill v. Alabama, and Schneider v. State% in a long para-
graph explaining why Congress's restrictions on union expendi-
tures in elections could not constitutionally be applied to a union 
periodical. He began with a reference to the first paragraph of 
the Footnote: 
As the Court has declared repeatedly, that [legislative] 
judgment does not bear the same weight and is not entitled to 
the same presumption of validity, when the legislation on its 
face or in specific application restricts the rights of conscience, 
expression and assembly protected by the [Frrst) Amendment, 
as are given to other regulations having no such tendency.97 
The Government, however, argued that Congress clearly had the 
power to regulate federal elections and that because of this the 
usual preeminence of the Hrst Amendment disappeared and was 
outweighed by the clearly rational basis behind Congress's enact-
ment. Rutledge noted that there was a question whether this ar-
gument might not be applicable to all powers of Congress "to 
destroy the principles stated for securing the preferential status 
of the Hrst Amendment freedoms . . . . "9s Passing that "ques-
93. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone at 806 (cited in note 11 ). 
94. 330 u.s. 1 (1947). 
95. Id. at 62 n.61. The reference to "Remonstrance" is to Madison's Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 2 Writings of James Madison 183, pars. 3, 9 
(Hunted. 1901-10), which Rutledge appended in full to his opinion. Id. at 63. Rutledge 
also cited Herbert Wechsler's article Stone and the Constitution, 46 Colum. L Rev. 764, 
795 (1946). 
96. 308 u.s. 147 (1939). 
97. United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U.S. 106, 140 (1948). 
98. Id. at 141. 
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tion," he cited a number of First Amendment cases requiring 
specificity when First Amendment freedoms were constricted, 
and found that the federal statute "falls far short of meeting 
these requirements .... "99 
By 1949, less than three years after Stone died, the preferred 
position concept had crept so far that it was used by Justice Stan-
ley Reed, one of the most conservative members of the Vinson 
Court, even as he ruled against a First Amendment defense. In 
Kovacs v, Cooper,too a sound truck case, Reed wrote for a plural-
ity of himself, Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Harold Burton, all 
of them relatively conservative on the First Amendment, to up-
hold a conviction for using a sound device that emitted "loud and 
raucous noises."tot In the course of his opinion Reed wrote 
"[t]he preferred position of freedom of speech in a society that 
cherishes liberty for all does not require legislators to be insensi-
ble to claims by citizens to comfort and convenience. "toz Among 
the authorities that Reed cited after the words "preferred posi-
tion" was Thomas v. Collins, to the page on which Rutledge had 
cited Carolene Products.I03 
Reed's use of the phrase provoked a famous response from 
Frankfurterto4 in the form of one of the many irritating concur-
rences that he was fond of appending,tos apparently to show that 
he was a former law professor. Frankfurter spent one paragraph 
on the merits, followed by seven pages making "additional obser-
vations" on Reed's use of the term, "preferred position," which 
he deemed "a mischievous phrase, if it carries the thought, which 
it may subtly imply, that any law touching communication is in-
fected with presumptive invalidity."HJ6 Frankfurter went through 
a list of seven principal cases, beginning with Herndon v. 
Lowryw1 in 1937, to which he attributed the growth of the doc-
trine. The second entry on his list was the Carolene Products 
footnote, which he printed out in the margin.tos His attack on 
Footnote Four is well-known: 
99. Id. at 142. 
100. 336 u.s. 77 (1949). 
101. ld. at 78. The plurality was joined by concurrences in result by Frankfurter and 
Jackson, who both had dissented in an earlier case striking down restrictions on sound 
devices. See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). Murphy, Rutledge, Black and Doug-
las dissented. 
102. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 88 (footnote omitted). 
103. Id. at 88 n.14. See text accompanying note 88. 
104. Id. at 89. 
105. See Richard H. Field, Frankfurter, J., Concurring, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 77 (1957). 
106. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 90. 
107. 301 u.s. 242, 258 (1937). 
108. 336 U.S. at 90 n.l. 
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A footnote hardly seems to be an appropriate way of an-
nouncing a new constitutional doctrine, and the Carotene foot-
note did not purport to announce any new doctrine; 
incidentally, it did not have the concurrence of a majority of 
the Court. It merely rephrased and expanded what was said in 
Herndon v. Lowry, supra, and elsewhere. It certainly did not 
assert a presumption of invalidity against all legislation touch-
ing matters related to liberties protected by the Bill of Rights 
and the Fourteenth Amendment. It merely stirred inquiry 
whether as to such matters there may be "narrower scope for 
operation of the presumption of constitutionality" and legisla-
tion regarding them is therefore "to be subjected to more ex-
acting judicial scrutiny. "109 
The seventh case on Frankfurter's list was Thomas v. Collins. 
Frankfurter conceded that Thomas contained "perhaps the 
strongest language dealing with the constitutional aspect of legis-
lation touching utterance. "no But Frankfurter claimed that 
Thomas was an opinion of only four Justices since Jackson had 
written a concurrence.tn Based on his excursion through the 
cases, Frankfurter argued that 
In short, the claim that any legislation is presumptively 
unconstitutional which touches the field of the Flrst Amend-
ment and the Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as the latter's 
concept of "liberty" contains what is specifically protected by 
the First, has never commended itself to a majority of this 
Court.112 
Several points need to be noted about Frankfurter's concur-
rence in Kovacs. First, of all, the Carolene Products footnote did 
indeed have a majority. As Lusky explains, there were only 
seven Justices sitting on the case, because Cardozo was ill, and 
the newly-appointed Stanley Reed had recused himself. Mc-
Reynolds dissented, Butler concurred in result only, and Hugo 
Black disassociated himself from the entire section of the opinion 
in which the footnote appeared. That left Stone, Hughes, Bran-
deis and Roberts, making a majority of four out of seven.n3 The 
Court has always treated a majority of those sitting as sufficient 
109. Id. at 90-92. 
110. Id. at 94. 
111. ld. 
112. Id. at 94-95. 
113. Lusky, Our Nine Tribunes at 124 (cited in note 9); Lusky, 82 Colum. L. Rev. at 
1097 (cited in note 10). Black's unwillingness to join in Part III of the opinion seems to 
have had nothing to do with Footnote Four. See his letter to Stone, reproduced in Our 
Nine Tribunes at 182 (cited in note 9) and in Lusky, 82 Colum. L. Rev. at 1109 (cited in 
note 10). 
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to speak for the Courtn4 and the Stone opinion was described in 
the Reports as the opinion of the Court. Similarly, Rutledge's 
opinion in Thomas v. Collins, which relied in part on the foot-
note to support the preferred position doctrine, was styled the 
opinion of the Court, and there is no indication that Jackson was 
concurring only in result. On top of that, Frankfurter admitted 
that several other cases referred to First Amendment freedoms 
as in a preferred position,us and simply dismissed them as "[a] 
number of Jehovah's Witnesses cases,"n6 as if that somehow un-
dermined their constitutional force. Even Lusky, who dislikes 
the preferred position doctrine and is very sympathetic to Frank-
furter's Kovacs concurrence, concedes that Frankfurter over-
stated his case.u1 And Rutledge concluded his dissent in Kovacs 
by saying 
I would add only that I think my brother FRANKFURTER 
demonstrates the conclusion opposite to that which he draws, 
namely, that the First Amendment guaranties of the freedoms 
of speech, press, assembly and religion occupy preferred posi-
tion not only in the Bill of Rights but also in the repeated deci-
sions of this Court.118 
The term "preferred position" seems to have gone out of 
fashion in the years after Kovacs,n9 but the concept has pre-
vailed. Lawrence Tribe gives a major portion of his treatise to 
"The Model of Preferred Rights: Liberty Beyond Contract,"12o 
and Gerald Gunther speaks of a "double standard" in his 
casebook's discussion of Footnote Four.m And even Frank-
furter in his very concurrence attacking the concept, conceded 
that the underlying idea came from his idol, Holmes-that 
without freedom of expression, thought becomes checked and 
atrophied. Therefore, in considering what interests are so fun-
114. See Robert Stem, Eugene Gressman, & Stephen M. Schapiro, 2 Supreme Court 
Practice (7th ed. 1995}. 
115. E.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943): "Freedom of press, 
freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position." (Douglas, J., for the 
Court). See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. at 93. 
116. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 93. 
117. Lusky, Our Nine Tribunes at 127-29 (cited in note 9); Lusky, 82 Colum. L Rev. 
at 1100-02 (cited in note 10}. 
118. 336 U.S. at 106. 
119. This is applauded by Lusky, Our Nine Tribunes at 129 (cited in note 9); Lusky, 
82 Colum. L. Rev. at 1102 (cited in note 10). 
120. Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 769 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 
1988); Tribe's index gives the general citation of pages 769-1435 for the entry "Preferred 
Rights." I d. at 1771. 
121. Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 462-65 (Foundation Press, 12th ed. 1991). 
See also note 3 and accompanying text. 
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damental as to be enshrined in the Due Process Clause, those 
liberties of the individual which history has attested as the in-
dispensable conditions of an open as against a closed society 
come to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when 
appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting 
economic arrangements.122 
Frankfurter said that his complaint with the concept of the 
preferred position was that it "expresses a complicated process of 
constitutional adjudication by a deceptive formula[,] a formula 
[that] makes for mechanical jurisprudence."123 He made similar 
comments in his concurrence in the 1951 Communist case, Den-
nis v. United States.124 But what Frankfurter really showed was 
his lack of passion for civil liberties, especially those arising from 
the First Amendment. In an appropriate case Frankfurter would 
protect free speech,125 but most of the time he temporized and 
found excuses to support the Government.126 Footnote Four, es-
pecially as it was built upon by Rutledge and other members of 
the Court in the forties, called for passion in the defense of per-
sonal rights. And that makes a substantive difference. 
VI. WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN? 
It is important to remember that until1931 nobody had ever 
won a First Amendment case in the Supreme Court.127 The 
122. 336 U.S. at 95. 
123. Id. at 96. 
124. 341 u.s. 494, 526-27 (1951). 
125. See, e.g., American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941). 
126. See, e.g., his concurrence in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Curi-
ously, even though Frankfurter appears to have been supportive of what later became 
known as representation-reinforcement, see notes 54-61 and accompanying text, he dis-
sented bitterly in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the basic reapportionment case, 
which seems a paradigm in which the loaded political process could not give its victims an 
electoral remedy. See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 120-21 (cited in note 40). 
Frankfurter may have had greater passion for the constitutional protection of the 
rights of criminal defendants. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law at 777 (cited in note 120). I have often wondered if his 
willingness to subordinate press rights to those of criminal defendants, see, e.g., Maryland 
v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 921-35 (1950) (separate opinion of Frankfurter, 
J.); Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1227, 1261 (1979), may 
be attributed to his experience defending Sacco and Venzetti in the 1920s. See Joseph P. 
Lash, A Brahmin of the Law reprinted in Joseph P. Last, ed., From the Diaries of Felix 
Frankfurter 37-39 (Norton, 1975). 
127. There were some victories before 1930 in what we would today consider free 
speech cases, but the rationales of those cases were based on due process, substantive or 
procedural. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). For discussions of the conserva-
tive approach of the Supreme Court before the thirties, see Rabban, The First Amend-
ment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 Yale L.J. 514 (1981); Rabban, The Emergence of Modern 
First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1207 (1983). 
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Hughes Court, first with Stromberg v. Califomia128 and Near v. 
Minnesota129 in 1931 and then in 1937 with DeJonge v. Oregon130 
and Herndon v. Lowry,131 led the way to protection of speech 
and press rights. But it was in the post-1937 Roosevelt Court, 
first under Hughes and then under Stone, that enforcement of 
First Amendment rights became the norm.n2 It was that Court 
which put forth the Carolene Products footnote, and it was that 
Court which built on it to produce the preferred position theory 
of individual rights. 
When Louis Lusky noticed that Carolene Products' pre-
sumption in its text of the constitutionality of commercial legisla-
tion might take the Court too far out of the business of judicial 
review, he made an important contribution to constitutional law. 
No doubt Justice Stone agreed with Lusky's idea, which tied judi-
cial activism to redress of the failures of the majoritarian electo-
ral process and to prejudice against defenseless minorities. No 
doubt it was Charles Evans Hughes who changed the focus when 
he asked "does not the difference lie not in the test but in the 
nature of the right involved?"133 And no doubt Stone wanted 
Hughes's vote so that he could have a four-man majority of the 
seven Justices sitting on the case. But Lusky allows his loyalty to 
the original structure of the footnote to blind him: Footnote Four 
wasn't Louis Lusky's work; it wasn't Harlan Fiske Stone's work; 
it wasn't Charles Evans Hughes's work. It was the Supreme 
Court's work. 
The genesis and evolution of Footnote Four shows how an 
idea develops in a collegial body like the Supreme Court. Ini-
tially Stone was simply burying freedom of contract and substan-
tive due process. Then his twenty-three year old law clerk 
showed him how the presumption of constitutionality in his text 
might undermine attacks on unfair legislation distorting the elec-
toral process. Then the Chief Justice pointed out how this ig-
nored the nature of the substantive rights involved, particularly 
128. 283 u.s. 359 (1931). 
129. 283 u.s. 6rJ7 (1931). 
130. 299 u.s. 353 (1937). 
131. 301 u.s. 242 (1937). 
132. The impact of the Roosevelt Court is apparent in the lip service that the more 
conservative Truman appointees had to pay to the First Amendment in the cold war case 
of Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), which upheld the prosecution of leaders of 
the American Communist Party over First Amendment objections. Even those support-
ing the Government conceded, in Chief Justice Vinson's words, that "we must pay special 
heed to the demands of the First Amendment marking out the boundaries of speech." I d. 
at 502-03. 
133. See note 18 and accompanying text. 
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freedom of speech. Then Stone rewrote the footnote, making 
clear in his letter to Hughes that he had no disagreement, and 
wished to protect both explicitly protected rights and those which 
needed the more general protection of the due process clause. 
Only then did Footnote Four as we know it appear, and when it 
did, it spoke with the voice of the Court. 
Equally, we can see that the members of the Court, includ-
ing Stone, applied Footnote Four in the next decade primarily to 
protect freedom of speech, and to put forth the notion that indi-
vidual rights are special, are more important than "shifting eco-
nomic arrangements" (to use Frankfurter's own words). 
Whether or not this is called the preferred position, it goes back 
even before Carolene Products, at least to Cardozo's description 
of "freedom of thought and expression" in Palko v. Connecticut. 
"Of that freedom one may say that it is the matrix, and indispen-
sable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom. "134 To-
day, the notion that an action by government that restricts speech 
is presumptively unconstitutional is hardly a radical notion.135 
Most important, though, is the fact that the Carolene Prod-
ucts Footnote is about values.136 Louis Lusky, who genuinely 
cares about minority rights, had no doubt about their constitu-
tional value,137 though he opposed the extension of many others. 
In this respect he differed from John Ely,t3s who tried, unsuccess-
fully, to create a value-neutral system of judicial activism.t39 But 
134. 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937). 
135. The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing 
speech ... or even expressive conduct ... because of disapproval of the ideas 
expressed. . . . Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid. 
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992) (Scalia, J., for the Court) (citations 
omitted). 
The notion seems to have been opposed by Robert Bork in his famous essay, NeuJTal 
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 41 Ind. L.J. 1 (1971); see also Robert 
Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 Wash. U. L Q. 
695. But then, the egregiousness of Bork's views in the late twentieth century was a ma-
jor reason for the Senate's rejection of his nomination to the Supreme Court. 
136. Lea Brilmayer, who writes about Footnote Four from the point of view of a 
conflict of laws scholar, agrees, and shows at some length, Lea Brilmayer, 134 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. at 1306-15 (cited in note 49), that the third paragraph is value-laden, indeed, that it is 
based on what she calls "a natural law of process." Id. at 1330-33. 
137. See Lusky, Our Nine Tribunes at 132 (cited in note 9). In a real sense, Lusky's 
whole life has shown a strong devotion to minority rights, and the thesis of Our Nine 
Tribunes is a call for "universal kinship." See id. at 172-76. See also Lusky, 52 Yale L.J. 1 
(cited in note 23). 
138. "I have also noted the failure of John Hart Ely, in Democracy and Distrust, to 
recognize the substantive commitment to self-government and to racial, religious, and 
ethnic equality that the Footnote reflects." Lusky, Our Nine Tribunes at 132 (cited in 
note 9). 
139. I have no desire to get into a long discussion of Ely's book, which is the most 
important, and probably the best, book on constitutional law of this generation. Suffice it 
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both of them, along with Felix Frankfurter and, in my view, the 
whole legal process/neutral principles school, suffer from an un-
willingness to accept the notion that constitutional law cannot be 
reduced to a logic game.140 From the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, through the framing and amending of the Constitution it-
self, and through the two hundred years of decisions by the 
Court, values have been what constitutional law is about. This is 
not the place to explore how this squares with democracy, but it 
is the place to point out that the Court that produced Footnote 
Four seems to have understood that point, and that it seems to 
have meant what it said. 
to say that his attacks on both interpretivism and non-interpretivism are brilliant and 
convincing, but his solution, the second half of his book, left this reader, at least, asking 
what basis his solutions had other than his belief that they were important. For a couple of 
the many reviews suggesting this, see Laurence Tribe, 89 Yale L.J. 1063 (cited in note 49); 
and Gerald E. Lynch, Book Review, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 857 (1980). 
140. In a letter passed on to me by a mutual friend, with Professor Lusky's approval, 
Lusky wrote of this passage: "I can only conclude that Professor Linzer has not noticed 
my assertion in the introduction to Our Nine Tribunes (p.xiii ff.) that I do not insist on 
'rigid consistency and elegant simplicity.' " 
